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Abstract: The transition to democracy in Bulgaria is commonly defined as a coup d’état 
carried  out  by  the  Bulgarian  Communist  Party  (BCP)  elites  against  the  long-standing 
dictator Todor Zhivkov. The Bulgarian transition to democracy was a direct by-product of 
the economic and political collapse of the USSR. No contentious events had any important 
impact on the democratization process. In brief, Bulgaria was the USSR’s closest ally, acting 
as a satellite state. The collapse of the USSR (signaled by the fall of the Berlin Wall) implied 
the end of Bulgarian communism. No other way out was possible at that point in time. The 
transition was peaceful and elite-led due to the “positive” examples of Poland, Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia, as well as the wish to avoid entering into a cycle of violence similar to that 
suffered in Romania.
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Introduction
The transition to democracy in Bulgaria is commonly defined as a coup carried 
by Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) elites against the long-standing dictator 
Todor Zhivkov (Linz and Stepan,  1997: 338-339). The role of mobilizations 
prior to the coup was irrelevant and almost non-existent, with the exception of 
conflicts with the Turkish ethnic minority (Spirova, 2010: 403). As Dimitrov 
(2001: 35) states: “Bulgaria’s transition to democracy began not as a result of 
internal  evolution  but  rather  as  a  part  of   an  attempt  by  some  Zhivkov’s 
colleagues  to  save  their  power  at  a  time  when  the  communist  bloc  was 
collapsing around them”. In other words, the key feature in the transition was 
the collapse of the USSR and how this affected Bulgaria.
Periodization
Concerning  the  periodization  of  the  transition  to  democracy,  the  common 
agreement is that in Bulgaria “… the transition goes from the fall of Zhivkov to 
the adoption of a new constitution a year-a-half later. During this period, the 
influence of opposition leader Zheliu Zhelev was at its height and was reflected 
5
in  the  roundtable  negotiations  between  the  ruling  Communists,  who  soon 
changed their name to Socialists,  and the opposition.  The critical  June 1990 
elections and the work of the Grand National Assembly laid the groundwork for 
the postcommunist era in politics” (Bell, 1997: 353). The centrality of the round 
table  negotiations  was  acknowledged  by  several  authors  (Todorova,  1992; 
Kolarova  and  Dimitrov,  1996;  Crampton,  1997;  Dimitrov,  2001;  Giatzidis, 
2002),  and  led  some  scholars  to  say  that  the  dynamics  of  the  Bulgarian 
transition to democracy were defined by a “… relatively prolonged round-table 
negotiation  resulting  in  an  agreement  to  proceed  with  constitutional 
amendments  designed  to  allow  democratic  and  fair  elections  to  select  a 
Constituent Assembly...” (Kolarova, 1999: 150).
First phase: from the end of the Communist bloc to the coup
The transition in Bulgaria saw just two contentious events. The first took place 
in  March  1988,  and  was  organized  by  members  of  the  dissident  elites  in 
cooperation with the population of  a  city  on the border  with Romania.  The 
second was from May-September 1989, organized by the Turkish and Muslim 
minority living on the border with Turkey. While the first event had no impact 
on the transition, the second was important for the anti-Zhivkov BCP elites.
In Russe, a city close to the border with Romania, around 5000 people 
suffering  the  effects  of  pollution  organized  a  demonstration  against 
industrialization without environmental conscience. According to Bell, “In the 
city of Russe, which was being slowly poisoned by chlorine gas emissions from 
a  Romanian  chemical  combine  across  the  Danube  River,  celebrities  from 
politics,  the arts and sport formed an ecological movement,  Ekoglasnot,  that 
openly challenged the regime’s indifference to the destruction of the Bulgarian 
environment” (1997: 358). The mobilization had no impact on environmental 
policies, but represented the first instance of defiance to the absolute power of 
the BCP.
True defiance came one year later from the Turkish minority. In 1984 and 
1985, Zhivkov had implemented a process of compulsory bulgarianization of 
the Turkish minority, forcing 10% of the Bulgarian population to change their 
names to Slavic ones, and forbidding the use of written and spoken Turkish and 
Muslim  religious  practices.  Even  though  this  policy,  called  the  Revival 
Campaign, was condemned around the globe, in 1989 Zhivkov resuscitated the 
policy of forced assimilation. While there was no confrontation during the first 
forced assimilation process, this second time Zhivkov was faced with Turkish 
resistance: in May 1989 a protest was organized in the small town of Kaolinovo 
in  the  northeast  of  Bulgaria  (Todorova,  1992:  155;  Kolarova  and  Dimitrov, 
1996: 180-181). Immediately after, 300 suspected activists were expelled from 
Bulgaria  (Kolarova  and  Dimitrov,  1996:  181).  Among  the  few  existing 
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narrations of these events, Bell’s (1997: 359) is particularly clear:
During the spring, a new challenge to Zhivkov’s regime emerged in the regions 
of heavy Turkish population. Since the brutal Revival Campaign of 1984-85, 
ethnic  Turks  had  prepared  an  underground  organization  [called  the  Turkish 
National  Liberation  Movement  in  Bulgaria]  that  now undertook  a  series  of 
hunger strikes and demonstrations, soon escalating to violent clashes with the 
authorities and several deaths. By the end of May there were demonstrations 
with thousands of participants, forcing Zhivkov to appear on national television 
to  quell  rumors  of  massive  unrest.  Denying  that  Bulgaria  had  a  substantial 
Turkish minority,  he repeated the fiction that most of the ethnic Turks were 
really  Bulgarians  who  had  been  forcibly  converted  to  Islam and  a  Turkish 
identity  during  the  Ottoman  period.  He  attributed  disturbances  among 
Bulgaria’s Muslims to confusion over the terms of a new passport law and to an 
anti-Bulgarian campaign carried on by Turkey and he challenged the Turkish 
government to open its borders to Bulgarian Muslims, so that it would be clear 
how few were discontented with life in Bulgaria. When Turkey responded to 
Zhivkov’s challenge by declaring that it would accept refugees from Bulgaria, 
the authorities launched a broad reign of terror against the ethnic Turks, forcing 
thousands to  cross  the border,  where they found refuge in  hastily organized 
camps.  Before  the  Turkish  government  again  closed  the  border,  more  than 
300,000 ethnic Turks had abandoned or were driven from Bulgaria [in June-
September 1989], an exodus that focused world-wide attention on Bulgaria’s 
human rights records and disrupted an already shaky economy.
The  forced  assimilation  campaign  of  1984-1985  and  its  1989  reprise  are 
considered as key events that showed the BCP elites that Zhivkov lacked the 
capacity or will to promote a liberalization process (Crampton, 1997: 214-215; 
Giatzidis,  2002: 47-48)1.  Within this setting, the coup was organized by two 
anti-Stalinist BCP leaders, Petûr Mladenov (at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
since 1971) and Dobri Dzhurov (at the Ministry of Defence). The coup was 
carried out on November 10th 1989, the day after East Germany had opened the 
Berlin Wall, in a BCP politburo meeting that accepted Zhivkov’s resignation. 
This forced resignation was the effect of an intra-elite coup that Mladenov had 
secretly coordinated with the support of Gorbachev.2 Then, all Zhivkov’s allies 
were expelled from the party at a fresh BCP meeting on November 13 th, and 
replaced  with  anti-Zhivkov  leaders.  The  BCP’s  control  was  completely 
consolidated on December 8th when Zhivkov and the entire BCP politburo were 
expelled from the party. From that point on the transition was fully led by post- 
and  anti-communist  elites  through  meetings  and  roundtables.  Contentious 
politics was avoided by both sides as it was feared this could escalate into a 
violent upsurge similar to that taking place in Romania (Dimitrov, 2001: 36-37).
1 Zhivkov was increasingly isolated. He was not only condemned by the Turkish government, but 
Bush (US) had also offered support to Turkey and placed sanctions on Bulgaria, while Gorbachev 
(USSR) said that they would not get involved while secretly condemning the action (Crampton, 1997: 
215). 
2 Mladenov visited Gorbachev in secret in Moscow on December 4-5th 1988 (Bell, 1997: 360, n. 20).
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The division of the BCP from the state was decided in a second meeting 
of the BCP on December 11-13th 1989, when Mladenov resigned from the party 
leadership  while  remaining  head  of  state.  Andrei  Lukanov,  another  anti-
Stalinist, became chairman of the renamed Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSF) in 
his stead.
On December 14th the anti-communist groups coordinated their efforts in 
the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) coalition for the first time and organized 
a demonstration in front of the parliament to ask for the dissolution of the secret 
police and the end of the BCP (Dimitrov, 2001: 37).
On  December  29th Mladenov  declared  that  the  forced  assimilation 
program had ended and condemned it.  Turkish people were free to return to 
Bulgaria, reassume their names, language and religious activities. In addition, 
and as a result of the UDF protest, Mladenov dissolved the secret police, the 
“Committee for State Security”.
Trade union independence from the BCP was also a swift process. On 
February 16th 1990, the Central Council of Trade Unions (CCTU) declared its 
independence from the party and elected a new leadership immediately after the 
BCP meeting.  In  parallel,  a  new independent  union  was  created:  Podkrepa 
emerged as the post-communist trade union (Crampton, 1997: 216-217; Tafel 
and Boniface, 2003; Robertson, 2004).
Finally, the main organization of the student movement was dissolved at 
the same time that the BCP and CCTU underwent changes. The Communist 
Youth League dissolved itself in February, and immediately after created a new 
student association that declared itself independent from the BCP and the state 
(Bell, 1997; Crampton, 1997: 217).
Second phase: from the coup to the new constitution
Beginning on January 3rd 1990, the anti-communist  coalition UDF, the post-
communist  BSF  and  the  Bulgarian  Agrarian  National  Union  (BANU) 
conservative pre-communist party initiated a series of roundtables that ended 
with  the  elaboration  of  new  political  institutions  for  Bulgaria.  A  new 
Constitution was agreed upon and the first free and open elections called. The 
whole  second  phase  of  the  transition  was  dominated  by  these  inter-elite 
negotiations, with no important contentious events either in favour or against 
them.  The  results  of  these  negotiations  were  expressed  in  three  agreements 
signed on March 12th 1990. The agreement stated: 1. the call for elections for a 
new  national  assembly  that  would  (within  18  months)  elaborate  a  new 
constitution while functioning as the national parliament; 2. that the national 
elections would be held on two days, June 10th and 17th,  using two different 
electoral rules, and; 3. that Mladenov would hold the presidency of the country 
during the whole period until the elaboration of the new constitution. Finally, 
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and  as  a  result  of  the  violent  transition  in  Romania,  all  the  parties  and 
organizations  agreed  that  no  extra-institutional  means  would  be  used  in  the 
transitional  period.3 Following  this  agreement,  intra-parliamentarian  disputes 
were the most important arenas of contention until the end of the transition on 
May 15th 1990, when the new constitution was elaborated and the roundtable 
talks  ended  (Bell,  1997;  Kolarova  and  Dimitrov,  1996:  205-208;  Kolarova, 
1999).
The first free and open elections were evaluated by anti-communists and 
international observers as transparent and fair. The BSF won with 47.15% of the 
votes, followed by the UDF with 36.2% and the BANU with 8.03% (Bell, 1997: 
369, table 9.2). This gave the post-communist elites control of the government, 
but  not  a  clear  majority  to  promote  change  without  the  agreement  of  anti-
communist forces. In addition, the decision to shape Bulgaria as a parliamentary 
system with a weak president made the parliament the arena for the resolution 
of post- and anti-communist elite conflicts.  This fact produced very unstable 
governments, but quickly institutionalized the democratization process. Finally, 
exchanges of power between the BSP and the UDF were never total, since the 
electoral  victories  of  one  or  the  other  were  never  absolute,  leading  –as  is 
common in  parliamentary  systems-  to  the  creation  of  coalition  governments 
(Crampton,  1997;  Dimitrov,  2001;  Giatzidis,  2002).  In  other  words,  the 
transition  is  generally  considered  to  be  successful  because  “The  established 
system  of  government  has  proved  to  be  stable  and  capable  of  channelling 
political and social conflicts smoothly” (Kolarova, 1999: 151).
Structural conditions
Communist Bulgaria is commonly regarded as a one-party authoritarian regime 
with a single undisputed leader: Todor Zhivkov (Spirova, 2010). Specifically, 
according to Linz and Stepan (1996: 42-43), Bulgaria should be considered as a 
case  of  early  post-totalitarianism.  This  means  that  Bulgaria  was  an  almost 
totalitarian regime, except for the fact that Zhivkov shared some power with the 
BCP politburo. In addition, the regime had a very close relationship with the 
USSR,  with  Sofia  linked  to  Moscow  as  if  Bulgaria  were  another  Soviet 
Republic. This relationship led to the USSR’s heavy investment in the quick 
industrialization  of  Bulgaria,  which  produced  several  important  changes  in 
society.
First,  there  was  a  demographic  transformation:  Bulgaria  entered  its 
communist era as a mainly rural and non-industrialized society, and ended this 
stage in its history as a mainly urban and highly industrialized country:
3 This agreement was also signed by both trade unions and all social movement organizations, which 
accepted to refrain from calling strikes or mobilizations.
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The combined effects of the extremely rapid industrialization and the miserable 
overpopulation  in  the  countryside  in  the  interwar  period,  alongside  the 
administrative pushing through of  the collectivization program, resulted in a 
drastic change in the rural/urban ratio of the country: from 24.7 percent in 1946 
the  urban  population  almost  doubled  by 1965 (46.5  percent),  to  reach  66.4 
percent in 1987. This depletion of the number of agricultural workers resulted in 
an automatic swelling of the ranks of industrial, construction, and transportation 
workers (Todorova, 1992: 152).
Second,  there  was a  process of  cultural  assimilation with Russia.  Bulgaria’s 
Russophile policy was such that “Since the early 1950s Bulgaria was beyond 
any doubt the closest  Soviet satellite in Eastern Europe, and the Communist 
regime was perhaps the most stable in the region. The ‘total assimilation with 
USSR’ doctrine promoted by the ruling party elite reached an apogee in the 
discussions  held  in  1961-1962  at  the  politburo  level,  considering  possible 
political unification and Bulgaria’s application to join the USSR” (Kolarova and 
Dimitrov, 1996: 179). As a result of this, Bulgaria’s international relationships 
were  not  those  of  a  sovereign  state,  but  rather  followed  the  decisions  and 
changes  of  USSR  foreign  policy  as  decided  in  Moscow.  This  fact  was  so 
relevant that the coup against Zhivkov is commonly regarded as planned with 
the authorization of Gorbachev (Bell, 1997; Crampton, 1997; Dimitrov, 2001; 
Giatzidis, 2002).
It was the collapse of these two crucial elements that led to the end of 
communism in Bulgaria. First, the country’s model of economic development 
began  to  meet  with  difficulties  due  to  technological  changes,  political 
transformations and bad internal decisions. A specific combination of factors led 
to the collapse of the Bulgarian economy: 1. the 1985-1986 fall in oil prices led 
to the loss of the country’s only dollar market in the Middle East, and 2. the 
disintegration  of  the  Eastern  European  and  Soviet  markets,  the  only  export 
destinations for  Bulgarian goods,  left  the country with no consumers for  its 
industrialized products (Todorova, 1992: 149). In other words, the Bulgarian 
economy suffered in the late 1980s from a profound structural crisis. Second, 
there was the change in the USSR’s political approach to Bulgaria.
Cleavages
Class and urban/rural cleavages are not regarded as important organizing factors 
of politics in communist Bulgaria. According to Karasimeonov (1999b), there 
were two main cleavages in Bulgaria during the 1980s: 1. ethnic: between the 
majority  of  the  Bulgarian  population  and  the  Turkish  minority  based  on  a 
nationalist discourse of forced assimilation and the resistance to this process by 
the Turkish minority; 2. political: between modernizers, pro-western groups that 
wanted to open the country to international reform and the traditionalists, tightly 
linked  to  the  USSR,  who were  in  favour  of  increasing  integration  with  the 
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Soviet Union (Karasimeonov, 1999b: 44). 
According to Kolarova, the main cleavage of post-communist Bulgaria 
was the “transitional” one, meaning that “… the main divide between their [BSP 
and UDF] party platforms and their voters’ attitudes is of an ‘ideological’ nature 
(pro-communist/anti-communist)”,  and  she  adds  “The  classic  socioeconomic 
cleavages do not yet divide parties and voters” (Kolarova, 1999: 151).
With a more complex view than Kolarova, Whitefield (2002) suggests 
that there are six main cleavages in post-communist Bulgaria, three social and 
three ideological.  The first  three  are:  1.  ethnic  (a  continuation of  the ethnic 
cleavage during communism between the majority of the population and the 
Turkish minority), 2. age/class (based on the distinction between those workers 
who lived most of their lives in the previous regime and those younger ones 
who entered the workforce during the capitalist era), and 3. religious (between a 
conservative  resurgence  of  Bulgarian  Orthodoxy  and  secular  visions  of 
religiosity). Concerning the ideological cleavage, he identifies the following: 1. 
economic (between liberal pro-western sectors and anti-western state-controlled 
economic visions); 2. ethnic (between those sectors in favour of the promotion 
of a multicultural Bulgaria and those in favour of a monist Bulgaria); and 3. 
nationalist  (based on the acceptance versus  the rejection of  the inclusion of 
Roma as nationals of Bulgaria).
International context
The international context was very important for the transition in Bulgaria. As 
Kolarova and Dimitrov (1996: 185) so nicely put it:
The changes in each of the Eastern European countries influenced the events in 
Bulgaria in different ways. The Polish case was used as a general model by both 
the BCP and UDF. The events in the German Democratic Republic were the last 
argument in favour of active and quick reform activity within the BCP and to a 
significant  extent  encouraged  the  beginning  of  mass  rallies.  The  events  in 
Czechoslovakia were a ‘positive example’ that was much more an ideal than a 
real  goal.  The  Romanian  ‘revolution’,  which  was  broadcast  live  by  the 
Bulgarian  national  television,  immensely  influenced  attitudes  toward  mass 
protest, creating fears of violence and terror. The Romanian case was often used 
as an argument in favour of the slow pace of transformations.
Notwithstanding  this,  dissidents  were  isolated  from  the  main  transnational 
coalitions against authoritarianism in the region during the resistance period. 
Prior to 1989 there was no Bulgarian participation in the transnational human 
rights coalitions. In addition, before 1989, there were no Bulgarian signatories 
to the Helsinki Memorandum of 1986 (Chilton, 1994). 
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Protests
In the period before the transition there is common agreement on the lack of 
mobilization or  the organization of  dissidents  against  the regime (Crampton, 
1997: 198-205; Kitschelt et al., 1995: 145; Giatzidis, 2002: 45). This situation 
was even recognized by the main leader of the pro-democratic forces:
The context in Bulgaria was very different from that of Central Europe, since 
there had been no organised opposition to the regime and somewhat less social 
pressure for change, especially in the countryside. Unlike the ruling parties of 
other Eastern Bloc countries, Bulgaria’s Communist regime, throughout its long 
reign, was never challenged by dissident forces or political groups. As Zhelev 
admitted, ‘only in Bulgaria nothing ever happened: not a single uprising, not a 
single  revolt  or  rebellion,  not  a  single  political  strike  or  a  student 
demonstration… Bulgaria can boast absolutely no practical attempt to topple the 
totalitarian system’ (Giatzidis, 2002: 45).
According to Giatzidis (2002: 44-47) there were no resistance movements in 
Bulgaria as a result of four main reasons: 1. the co-optation of intellectuals; 2. 
low ambitions  in  the  country  (as  the  Bulgarians  compared  themselves  with 
Greece  and  Turkey  on  welfare  indicators,  and  not  with  Western  European 
countries); 3. the close cultural relationship between Bulgaria and Russia which 
entailed a positive opinion on the USSR and its role in Bulgarian politics and 
economics;  and  4.  the  successful  and  rapid  industrialization  and  the 
accompanying improvement in welfare Zhivkov accomplished with the USSR’s 
help since the 1970s.  
According to Kitschelt  et  al.,  the reasons for the lack of mobilizations 
before  and  during  the  transition  to  democracy  are  partially  similar  to  those 
identified  by  Giatzidis:  “Outright  repression,  a  widely  accepted  parochial 
political culture, limited national sovereignty, and the clientelistic co-optation of 
most  intellectuals  into  the  system prevented  the  rise  of  challenging  groups 
similar to those that could be observed in the ‘national Communisms’ of Poland 
and Hungary in the 1970s and 1980s” (Kitschelt et al., 1995: 45). Even though 
Kitschelt  et  al.  include repression as one of  the important  reasons,  with the 
exception of a period of  large scale  killings in the 1940s-1950s,  there is  no 
information  on  physical  repression  since  the  de-Stalinization  of  Bulgaria  in 
1965 (Crampton, 1997: 184-195).
There  were  few  protest  events  during  the  transition  with  the  most 
important  being  the  Ekoglasnot mobilization  in  Russe,  and  the  Turkish 
resistance  to  the  second  round  of  forced  assimilation  in  1989.  While  the 
Ekoglasnot event had no impact on the transition process, the Turkish events 
were important in showing that Zhivkov was isolated and incapable of resolving 
the Bulgarian transition. Finally, there were no mobilizations against the neo-
communists with the exception of the UDF protest calling for the dissolution of 
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the secret police. 
One of the reasons for  the quasi non-existence of mobilizations is the 
effect produced on the Bulgarian elites and society by the massive violence seen 
in  Romania’s  democratization.  Even  though  widespread  violence  started  on 
December 15th 1989 in Romania, its emergence and peak were contemporary to 
the main events in Bulgaria, including the meetings of the BCP politburo and 
the UDF’s decision not to organize more protests after those of December 14th 
1989, held just one day before violence began in Transylvania. The Bulgarian 
coup was thus planned and coordinated with the USSR’s support, and regime 
change did not lead to violence because violence emerged in Romania just after 
the coup, scaring neo- and anti-communist elites alike. The fear of violence in 
Bulgaria was clearly expressed in the several peace agreements signed by the 
BSF,  UDF,  and  all  the  main  trade  unions  and  social  movements  between 
December 1989 and the summer of 1991 (Crampton, 1997: 220-223). These 
helped to quickly institutionalize the process in roundtables, leading to a fully 
elite-led transition with non-contentious dynamics.
Actors in the transition I: elites
The anti-communist elites
The  anti-communist  elites  were  irrelevant  during  the  coup,  emerging 
immediately after November 1989. More than fifty parties were founded, but 
there was only one main anti-communist coalition, founded on December 7 th 
1989 by ten parties and organizations. This was the Union of Democratic Forces 
(UDF),  and  was  composed  of  the  Federation  of  Clubs  for  the  Support  of 
Glasnost  and  Democracy,  Podkrepa Independent  Labour  Confederation,  the 
social-democratic party Bulgarian Agrarian National Union – Nikola Petkov, the 
Committee for Religious Rights, Freedom of Conscience and Spiritual Values, 
Ekoglasnot, the Independent Association for the Defence of Human Rights in 
Bulgaria, the Green Party, the Radical Democratic Party and the Democratic 
Party. The leader of the UDF was Zheliu Zhelev, the most prominent dissident 
in Bulgaria. Zhelev was a philosopher who had published a very popular book 
called “Fascism” in 1981 in which he put forward a clear critique of the BCP 
regime. Later, in 1989, he was the founder of  Ekoglasnot, organizing the first 
and only protest against Zhivkov before the November coup (Bell, 1997: 362-
363).
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The military and the secret police
The military and the secret police played no role either in favour or against the 
democratization process. Moreover, after the UDF mobilization calling for the 
dissolution  of  the  secret  police,  Mladenov’s  first  decision  in  power  was  to 
dissolve the Committee for State Security.
The church
The Orthodox Bulgarian Church was completely passive due to its links with 
the communist regime and internal conflicts. According to Giatzidis (2002: 22), 
“With the end of the 1950s even the Bulgarian Church lost its autonomy and 
thus was unable to play a role similar to that of the Catholic Church in Poland”. 
During  the  transition  the  Church  entered  into  a  period  of  internal  crisis 
involving those sectors that had been in power over the last 20 years and the 
formerly excluded prelates. This conflict was not related to struggles for the 
democratization of the Church, but rather to internal struggles for power. The 
consequence was that the Orthodox Bulgarian Church was in such crisis that it 
played no role in the transition, even in the roundtables (Raikin, 1996: 210-224; 
Crampton, 1997; Giatzidis, 2002).
The intellectuals
“Before  the  late  1980s  there  were  dissidents  in  Bulgaria,  but  no  organized 
dissident  movement.  In  part  this  was  due  to  Zhivkov’s  policy  of  heaping 
rewards  and  honors  on  compliant  intellectuals  and  to  the  small  size  of  the 
country and its intellectual communities” (Bell, 1997, 357). Among the causes 
for the lack of dissident intellectual organizations is Bulgaria’s cultural isolation 
from Western Europe and the very small emigrant community (Kolarova and 
Dimitrov, 1996: 180). However, there were the well-known cases of BBC and 
Radio Free Europe journalists (Georgi Markov and Vladimir Kostov) who had 
to  escape  from  Bulgaria  in  order  to  avoid  being  killed.  While  Kostov  did 
survive assassination attempts, Markov was assassinated in London by the BCP 
(Bell, 1997).4
Actors in the transition II: civil society
The e  nvironmental movement  
The first protest against the regime was organized in March 1988 on the border 
with Romania by the environmental movement. The organization behind this 
4 Petrova (2004: 164-167) offers a longer list of individual dissidents, but in no other case was a per-
son killed.
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protest was founded by the main dissident and UDF leader, Zhelev. Ekoglasnot 
was  a  small  intellectual  organization  that  coordinated  a  protest  against  a 
Romanian factory contaminating Bulgarian rivers with the local population of 
Russe, indirectly complaining in this way against the negative consequences of 
the quick industrialization of Bulgaria. According to Petrova, Ekoglasnot’s main 
goal did not concern environmental issues, but to question the regime in one 
way or another:
Ecoglasnot raised various concrete environmental issues and demanded a media 
law allowing independent associations to have their own free press. The link 
between  environmentalism  and  democratic  change  was  seen  as  follows: 
‘Ecology  is  not  a  single,  isolated  issue.  Followed  through  to  its  logical 
consequences, the demand for an ecological reconstruction is a call for radical 
social change. Proceeding from the assumption that the right to good health and 
environmental safety is a fundamental human right, the participants regard their 
movement as a part of the wider democratic movement for peace, human rights, 
freedom,  and  justice’.  The  strategy  included  a  variety  of  actions  -from 
cooperation  with  research  institutes  to  marches  to  the  parliament  and street 
demonstrations (Petrova, 2004: 174).
As  part  of  its  multiple  strategies,  Ekoglasnost  was  the  first  civil  society 
organization  to  request  state  recognition,  a  goal  achieved  after  the  fall  of 
Zhivkov:
Ecoglasnot  and  the  Committee  for  Religious  Freedom decided  to  apply  for 
registration as a strategy of expanding the sphere of the permissible but were 
recognized only after the fall of Zhivkov. While Ecoglasnot had no more than 
several dozen active members in summer 1989, it was firmly oriented at mass 
mobilization.  In  October,  the  group  began  collecting  signatures  against 
environmental projects of the government. What mattered to the members was 
not so much the concrete projects themselves, but creating the very possibility 
for thousands of people to sign something 'against' the system (Petrova, 2004: 
176).
Even though the environmental movement was responsible for the first protest 
against the regime, once Ekoglasnot achieved institutional recognition it became 
member  of  the  roundtables,  accepting  the  agreement  to  not  organize  street 
protests. Later on, once the roundtables had ended, it became an irrelevant actor 
in its attempts at organizational survival, suffering from several divisions which 
led  to  the  creation  of  a  couple  of  smaller  social  movement  organizations 
(Ekoglasnot ’89,  the  Political  Club  “Ekoglasnot”,  etc.)  and  two  very  small 
political parties (the Green Party and the Conservative and Ecological Party) 
(Meininger and Radoeva, 1996: 48-49; Koulov, 1998: 145-149; Giatzidis, 2002: 
119).
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The l  abour movement  
The labour movement was irrelevant during the resistance to the regime and the 
transition. However, its liberalization took place as quickly as the collapse of the 
regime, with the CCTU declaring its independence from the BCP as soon as 
February  16th 1990.  In  addition,  soon  after  Zhivkov  was  deposed,  a  new 
independent  union  was  created.  In  fact,  “Poland’s  Solidarity  inspired  the 
physician Konstantin Trenchev to create  Podkrepa (Support), an independent 
trade  union,  that  began  to  challenge  the  monopoly  of  the  party-controlled 
unions” (Bell, 1997: 358).
On  December  24th 1989  Podkrepa called  the  first  strike  of  the  post-
communist era, but this was merely a symbolic declaration since the union had 
no capacity to strike and no actual strike was held that day. Thus, “the threat by 
Podkrepa leaders sounded plausible only in the context of the political situation 
in Romania” (Kolarova and Dimitrov, 1996: 185).
Both the CCTU and  Podkrepa supported political  democratization and 
economic  liberalization  policies  during  the  transition  in  return  for  their 
participation in the roundtables and the new institutions that were being created 
(Tafel and Boniface, 2003: 324).
Conclusion
The Bulgarian transition to democracy is the direct by-product of the economic 
and political collapse of the USSR. No contentious events had any important 
impact on the democratization process. To sum up, Bulgaria was the USSR’s 
closest ally, acting as a satellite state. The collapse of the USSR (signaled by the 
fall of the Berlin Wall) implied the end of Bulgarian communism. No other way 
out was possible at that point in time. The transition was peaceful and elite-led 
due to the “positive” examples of Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, as well 
as the wish to avoid entering into a cycle of violence similar to that suffered in 
Romania.
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